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Abstract. In Sorgner’s 2009 paper “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism”, he 
argues, contra Bostrom, that the transhumanist movement’s postman is fundamentally 
similar to Nietzsche’s overman. In this paper, Sorgner’s thesis is challenged. It is argued 
that transhumanism, as presented both popularly and academically, is fundamentally 
incompatible with Nietzsche’s overman, as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This 
argument focuses on three significant characteristics’s of Zarathustra’s description of 
the overman: the role of earthly existence, immortality, and the rejection of collective 
values.
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Introduction
“Man is something to be overcome!” So declares, stridently and repeatedly, 
the prophet Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s antagonism to the human, as well as 
his urging to the beyond human, is contained within a wider evolutionary 
perspective on man’s advancement as a species. Given contemporary 
attitudes, expressed by transhumanism, concerning the same perspective, 
Zarathustra stands as a possible proponent and opponent of transhu-
manism. Does he see man’s evolution beyond himself in a like way to the 
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transhumanists? Would Zarathustra argue that transhumanism is merely 
another step in the progression from man to higher men to overman? Does 
the transhumanists’s postman fit the description of the übermensch1? In 
his paper, “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism”, Stefan Lorenz 
Sorgner argues that transhumanism is compatible with – if not a mani-
festation of – Nietzsche’s own conceptualization of the overman. In this 
paper, I will critique Sorgner’s thesis narrowly, arguing that transhumanism 
is not compatible with at least Zarathustra’s conception of the overman.2 
This critique will be presented in three parts. First, I will briefly define 
transhumanism. Then, I will situate my paper within the larger discussion 
of Nietzsche by transhumanists; following this, I will summarize Sorgner’s 
thesis, focusing on where he believes the transhumanists and Nietzsche 
agree. Finally, I will contrast transhumanism’s postman with Zarathustra’s 
overman, asserting that Zarathustra disagrees with the transhumanists with 
respect to three significant characteristics: the role of earthly existence, 
immortality, and collective values.
1. Transhumanism
What is transhumanism? Superficially, it is the social, scientific, and spiritual 
movement associated with names like Ray Kurzweil, Elon Musk, Zoltan Ist-
van, and George Church. The movement aims to actualize futuristic projects 
of human-machine interfacing, digital immortality, and positive eugenics 
practiced through gene editing. But beneath the grandiose promises of 
uploading our minds into the cloud or hacking our bodies through techno-
logical augmentation or DNA splicing, there lies a more rigorously defined 
philosophy and a fully developed value set that supports the aspirations 
1 Note: in this paper, I will treat ‘übermensch’, ‘overman’, and ‘overhuman’ as equivalent 
names for Zarathustra’s and Nietzsche’s concept of those beings which are beyond hu-
manity and human values.
2 For the purposes of this paper, I will take for granted that Zarathustra’s conception of the 
overman and Nietzsche’s conception of the overman are compatible. Thus, to not qualify 
as an overman according to one’s conception is to not qualify as an overman according to 
the other’s conception as well.
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of the Silicon Valley’s prophets of a new humanity. To understand better 
what transhumanism is, we need to understand the values and principles 
that shape the transhumanist paradigm. To understand these, we can turn 
to the expository and framing work done in the transhumanist literature.
We can begin with Nick Bostrom’s discussion of transhumanism in 
“Transhumanist Values”. In a section explaining transhumanism generally, 
Bostrom says that transhumanism aims at “understanding and evaluating 
the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human 
organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given 
to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information 
technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology 
and artificial intelligence” (Bostrom 2005, 3). Bostrom continues: “The 
enhancement options being discussed include radical extension of human 
health-span, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, 
and augmentation of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capac-
ities. Other transhumanist themes include space colonization and the 
possibility of creating superintelligent machines, along with other potential 
developments that could profoundly alter the human condition” (Ibid., 3). 
There are similarities between the “popular” transhumanist movement 
and Bostrom’s academic presentation of transhumanism. Both aim at the 
surpassing of biological humanness through technological means. Both also 
particularly aim at eliminating natural death and joining together human and 
machine intelligences. However, while these comparisons are apt, they do 
not yet answer questions about the underlying reasons for transhumanism. 
We know what the goals of transhumanism are. We do not yet know why 
transhumanism has these goals. 
Bostrom himself provides us with further explanatory work concerning 
transhumanism within his “A History of Transhumanist Thought”. After 
tracing some of the predecessors of transhumanism (both in history and 
in ideation), Bostrom gives us this lineage. The first use of the word ‘trans-
humanism’ is credited to Julian Huxley. In his Religion Without Revelation, 
Huxley describes transhumanism as the belief that humanity, as a biological 
species, can transcend the biological limits of being human (Bostrom 2005, 
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6). Next, F.M. Esfandiary is credited with the concept of the transhuman, 
understood as a transitional evolutionary stage between humanity at 
present and the eventual postman (humanity having transcended biological 
limits). Esfandiary’s transhuman is characterized by “prostheses, plastic 
surgery, intensive use of telecommunications, a cosmopolitan outlook and 
a globetrotting lifestyle, androgyny, mediated reproduction (such as in vitro 
fertilization), absence of religious belief, and a rejection of traditional family 
values” (Bostrom 2005, 11). Finally, Max More is credited with the “first 
definition of transhumanism in its modern sense”. More’s transhumanism 
“emphasized the principles of ‘boundless expansion,’ ‘self-transformation,’ 
‘dynamic optimism,’ ‘intelligent technology,’ and ‘spontaneous order’3” 
(Bostrom 2005, 12). This progression of transhumanism culminates in 
the 1998 founding of the World Transhumanist Association by Bostrom 
and fellow philosopher David Pearce. The WTA is said to have spurred the 
academic development of transhumanism. As precursor to this development, 
Bostrom points to the founding documents of the WTA. The Transhumanist 
Declaration, one of these documents, presents many of the principles that 
underlie the already-mentioned goals of transhumanists. 
The Declaration begins by acknowledging that technological advance-
ment will allow for the “redesigning of the human condition”. This process 
is one that transhumanists welcome – “Transhumanists think that by being 
generally open and embracing of new technology we have a better chance 
of turning it to our advantage …” – and claim as a moral right – “Transhu-
manists advocate the moral right for those who wish to use technology to 
extend their mental and physical (including reproductive) capacities and 
to improve their control over their lives”. The Declaration concedes that the 
process of technological enhancement of humans could be harrowing – “… 
it is mandatory to take into account the prospect of dramatic progress in 
technological capabilities. It would be tragic if the potential benefits failed 
to materialize because of technophobia and unnecessary prohibitions. On 
the other hand, it would also be tragic if intelligent life went extinct because 
3 Bostrom notes that this principle was later replaced with “open society”.
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of some disaster or war involving advanced technologies”. The document 
ends with an endorsement of the principle of beneficence – “Transhumanism 
advocates the well-being of all sentience (whether in artificial intellects, 
humans, posthumans, or non- human animals) and encompasses many 
principles of modern humanism” (Bostrom 2005, 21). Primarily in the 
Declaration (although even in the views of some of the earlier figures 
named), we finally are given some of the reasons for the transhumanists’ 
claims concerning going beyond our biological human-ness. Transhumanists 
accept cosmopolitan or humanist values. Transhumanists are optimistic 
and open concerning future advances in technology. Transhumanists value 
self-transformation and believe it to be a basic human right. Finally, and 
most importantly, transhumanists argues for the “well-being of all sen-
tience”; transhumanism aims broadly at the good of any sensing being. It is 
because of these values and principles that transhumanists want things like 
immortality and enhanced physical capacities. We now have the beginnings 
of an answer to the question of ‘why transhumanism?’.
Going beyond Bostrom’s work in the literature, we can look for more 
responses to the question of ‘why transhumanism?’. In their “Introduction 
to Post- and Transhumanism”, Robert Ranisch and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner 
define transhumanism as the “stance that affirms the radical transformation 
of human’s biological capacities and social conditions by means of technol-
ogies” (Ranisch and Sorgner 2014, 7–8). They continue: the “result of such 
technologically induced version of evolution is referred to as the posthu-
man”. They add “… transhumanism, according to its self-understanding, is 
a contemporary renewal of humanism. It embraces and eventually amplifies 
central aspects of secular and Enlightenment humanist thought, such as 
belief in reason, individualism, science, progress, as well as self-perfection 
or cultivation” (Ibid., 8). Echoing the Declaration, Ransich and Sorgner affirm 
the importance of humanist values to the transhumanist project. They 
also identify beneficence as the primary value for transhumanists: “they 
[transhumanists and authors associated with transhumanism] all share the 
belief in the desirability of technologically supported human enhancement 
procedures” (Ibid., 13). (It should be noted that Ranisch and Sorgner also 
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present a historical picture of the emergence of transhumanism similar to 
Bostrom: Huxley, Esfandiary, Ettinger (also named by Bostrom in “A History 
of Transhumanist Thought”), and More. Adding to Bostrom, Ransich and 
Sorgner note that the WTA became Humanity+; Bostrom founded the 
Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies around that same time. 
Both organizations work to promulgate transhumanism.)
 James Hughes provides clarification about which values qualify as 
humanist values in his “Contradictions from the Enlightenment Roots 
of Transhumanism”. Classifying transhumanism as an Enlightenment 
philosophy, Hughes defines the Enlightenment according to the belief that 
societal progress could be achieved through the application of human reason 
to the problems of the day (namely, scientific ignorance, questions of good 
governance, and systemic epistemic limits) (Hughes 2010, 623). Being a part 
of the Enlightenment tradition, transhumanism shares the flaws of said 
tradition. For the remainder of his paper, Hughes elaborates on these flaws. 
In these elaborations, we find an outline of what we might call, broadly, 
the humanist values of the Enlightenment thinkers (and so also, then, of 
the transhumanists). First, Hughes refers to reason; for the Enlightenment 
thinkers, reason was the sole epistemic ground that justified belief. It was to 
replace all other epistemic grounds, be they theological (revelation), personal 
(subjective experience or taste), or non-empirical (Ibid., 623–624). He sees 
transhumanists as needing to address the same worry that the Enlightenment 
thinkers are vulnerable to: the choice to prefer reason to unreasonableness 
cannot be justified by reason itself (Ibid., 625–626). Hughes also presents 
the problematic tension that exists between autonomous self-improvement 
and coerced-but-beneficent self-improvement. The value of autonomy – as 
demonstrated in classical liberalism – allows for persons to choose actions 
that are in their own best interests, assuming that persons both best know 
what is in their best interests as well as regularly choose to do actions that 
are in their best interests. However, given that people do not always choose 
to act in a way that aligns with what is best for them, Enlightenment thinkers 
also supported paternalism – as demonstrated in authoritarianism. Since 
people do not do what is best for themselves, they must be compelled to 
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become better (Ibid., 628–629). Hughes sees this same tension, unresolved, 
in the transhumanists’ dual desires to support individual rights while also 
ensuring that the ultimate evolution of the human species continues and 
culminates in the posthuman and in a society that is well fitted for the post-
human (Ibid., 629–630). Transhumanism also carries with it the teleological 
bent of the Enlightenment. Hughes connects the eschatology of Christian 
theology with the scientific triumphalism of the Enlightenment. Having 
replaced revelation with reason, the Enlightenment did not also discard the 
Aristotelian metaphysical framework of Christendom. Instead, this universe 
of form-matter-composed substances being ordered to nature-defined ends 
was adopted and adapted, with the optimism inherent in some versions 
of Christian eschatology also being carried forward. The Enlightenment 
replaced heaven with this-world progress as the final end of human actions. 
Hughes sees this triumphalism restored in the transhumanists’ beliefs in 
events like the singularity, their beliefs in technological development, and 
their beliefs in the inevitability of progress. This triumphalism runs counter, 
however, to the scientific rejection of teleology (the example of unguided 
Darwinian evolution is offered) (Ibid., 631–633). Hughes presents yet another 
tension relevant to transhumanism that originates in the Enlightenment: 
the tension between ethical universalism and ethical relativism. Both 
Enlightenment thinkers and transhumanists must deal with conflicting 
ethical intuitions, it is said. Ethical universalism is supported by the moral 
claims made about every individual’s rights to self-determination and 
self-improvement. Ethical relativism is supported by moral claims’ being 
concretized in a particular historical context; radical progress might change 
this context so thoroughly that the norms which previously applied might 
no longer apply. These conflicting supports leave both the Enlightenment 
thinker and the transhumanist unable to satisfactorily decide between the 
assumption of universal moral rules and the assumption of relativized moral 
rules (Ibid., 633–634). In summary, the humanist values of the Enlighten-
ment that Hughes states are of particular importance to transhumanists 
as well – and that are particular challenges to transhumanism – include 
human reason, autonomy and paternalistic beneficence, scientific and 
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technological optimism and triumphalism, and the universality of rights 
and the contextual nature of moral norms. 
Combining the remarks garnered from Bostrom, Rasich and Sorgner, and 
Hughes, we can finally give a non-superficial answer to the twin questions 
‘what is transhumanism?’ and ‘why transhumanism?’. Broadly, transhuman-
ism is a school of practical philosophy that prioritizes the transformation 
of the biological human species through technological augmentation and 
enhancement. This transformation aims at creating the postman, a supe-
rior being evolved from humanity. Transhumanism espouses humanist 
values and principles: beneficence, autonomy, rationality, progressivism, 
and optimism. With this better understanding of transhumanism, we can 
begin to more closely examine problems that exist within the corpus of 
transhumanist works.
2. Nietzsche, Transhumanism, and Sorgner’s “Nietzsche,  
the Overman, and Transhumanism”
Transhumanism, as described above, is focused on an evolution beyond 
what humanity currently is; this is to say that transhumanists desire to 
transcend their own humanity and for other humans to also transcend 
their humanity. This going beyond has a goal: the posthuman, a new kind 
of being that has superhuman capacities and is not subject to the limits 
of body, finite mind, and mortality. Review of the transhumanist literature 
suggests a possible historical philosophical ally to this transhumanist proj-
ect: Friedrich Nietzsche. It is suggested that there are similarities between 
the transhumanist posthuman and Nietzsche’s own übermensch (see, for 
instance, Sorgner 2009). Particular attention is paid to Nietzsche’s own 
evolutionary story for the overman, a story that is said to be consistent with 
that given by transhumanists for the posthuman. Combined with Nietzsche’s 
explicit desire for humanity to transcend itself, some transhumanist authors 
argue that Nietzsche offers a compatible paradigm for transhumanists to 
operate in, if not an example of exactly the kind of thinking within the 
wider history of philosophy that transhumanists themselves try to defend. 
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 Sorgner’s article – “Nietzsche, the Overman, and Transhumanism” – in 
particular begat a fruitful discussion concerning Nietzsche’s relevance to, 
and agreement with, transhumanism. In Bostrom’s “A History of Transhu-
manist Thought”, both theses (Nietzsche’s relevance to and agreement with 
transhumanism) are denied. Bostrom characterizes transhumanism as only 
having “surface‐level similarities with the Nietzschean vision”. Instead, 
transhumanism, “with its Enlightenment roots, its emphasis on individual 
liberties, and its humanistic concern for the welfare of all humans (and 
other sentient beings) – probably has as much or more in common with 
Nietzsche’s contemporary the English liberal thinker and utilitarian John 
Stuart Mill” (Bostrom 2005, 4). 
Sorgner challenges Bostrom’s reading of Nietzsche, arguing that there 
are “significant similarities between the posthuman and the overhuman” 
that “can be found on a fundamental level” (Sorgner 2009, 30). Sorgner’s 
rebuttal is in turn challenged by numerous papers (see Hauskeller 2010, 
Hibbard 2010, Porter 2017, Agatonović 2018), although Max More supported 
Sorgner’s reading of Nietzsche (see More 2010). This debate would prompt 
a call for a special issue of the Journal of Evolution and Technology, one 
dedicated to the following question: “[t]o what extent does transhumanist 
thought resemble that of Nietzsche?” (Blackford 2010). Sorgner responded 
to various arguments raised in that special issue in “Beyond Humanism: 
Reflections on Trans- and Posthumanism” (Sorgner 2010). This paper is 
intended as another entry into this extended debate. Whereas previous 
papers have dealt with Nietzsche’s corpus at large, I will instead focus on 
the singular work in which Nietzsche details the overman4: Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Through detailed exegesis of the work, I will expand upon 
the efforts of Bostrom and Hauskeller, among others, to use the overman 
as a clear contrast to the posthuman. A close reading of Zarathustra will 
provide us with a clear set of criteria for the overman, a set of criteria that 
I will show the posthuman does not meet.
4 See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Within Nietzsche’s corpus, Thus Spoke Zarathus-
tra has a controversial place … one of Nietzsche’s most well-known and morally troubling 
figures—the superhuman—also appears substantially only in this work …”.
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Returning to Sorgner: he argues that the posthuman is compatible with 
Nietzsche’s overman. To develop this argument, Sorgner highlights some 
general similarities between transhumanists and Nietzsche.
First, Sorgner notes that both transhumanists and Nietzsche “hold a dy-
namic view of nature and values” (Sorgner 2009, 30). Both the transhumanists 
and Nietzsche believe that humanity, considered as a species, is not im-
mutable. Human do not have an unchangeable nature that precludes evolving. 
Furthermore, humans, while they do make particular normative judgments, do 
not have to make those particular judgments. These judgements are also not 
rooted in some unchangeable reality, and so can evolve. With respect to human 
nature, Sorgner thinks that Nietzsche defines humanity (among other things) 
according to will. A human is an individual that wills. In Sorgner’s lexicon, 
a human is a “will-to-power constellation”, a collection of states composed 
of an individual’s desires, power to accomplish those desires, and relations 
to other willing individuals (Ibid., 30–31). Because humans are defined 
primarily according to their will and their willings, they are fundamentally 
changing beings. Via Sorgner, Nietzsche believes that species are striations, 
groups of will-to-power constellations that are marked off by limits to their 
power to accomplish or satiate desires. As individuals in these groups gain in 
desire-accomplishing power, these individuals will eventually transcend the 
group. For this reason, Sorgner argues that Nietzsche’s definition of humanity 
does not prevent individual instantiations of the species from evolving beyond 
that species. Transcending humanity is something that individual humans 
can do. Sorgner believes that this is similar to transhumanists’ views: for the 
transhumanist, it is inevitable that human nature will not remain the same 
over time. Sorgner also sees values as changeable for both Nietzsche and the 
transhumanists. Since values are related to the actualization of power for 
Nietzsche, changes in values follow from the same principles that ground 
arguments for changes in natures. For transhumanists, Sorgner points to 
Bostrom’s openness to revising value judgements as new evidence related 
to what is valued is discovered or promulgated. 
The second similarity Sorgner discusses is shared approval by Nietzsche 
and transhumanists for science as a means for positively changing humanity. 
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Sorgner thinks Nietzsche appeals to a scientific attitude to ground his 
philosophy of the overman. Sorgner also interprets Nietzsche’s theses of 
eternal recurrence, will-to-power, and evolution as functioning as scientific 
theories (or at least as mirroring scientific theories) (Ibid., 33). It is the thesis 
of evolution, combined with the will to power dynamic, that Sorgner gestures 
to as providing humans reason to improve themselves (Ibid., 33). This project 
of self-betterment is one that Nietzsche shares with the transhumanists. 
While the project is more general with respect to the progression of humans 
to the overman – to transcend what I am and what I value, I must have the 
power to do so, and to have the power to transcend myself and my values, 
I must become better than what I am – this difference of particularity does 
not properly distinguish Nietzsche’s concept of self-betterment from the 
transhumanists’ concept of self-enhancement.
Sorgner continues by referencing a third point of agreement: both Ni-
etzsche and transhumanists believe values to be person-relative and per-
son-dependent. Connected to this is another point of agreement: the shared 
belief in the importance of holistic personal development. For Nietzsche, 
relative values and self-overcoming (what Sorgner understands holistic per-
sonal development to be for Nietzsche) are explainable by individual instances 
of willing. Since every willing individual will have particular desires and 
a particular set of relations to other willing individuals, what that individual 
judges to be valuable and how that individual judges he can best improve 
his own power will not be universalizable to other individuals. While species 
may be definable according to general limits on the power of individuals so 
classified, there will still be differences among those individuals with respect to 
their power. Sorgner assesses the claims made by transhumanists as following 
from similar argumentation. The transhumanist will rely on some notion of 
autonomy or personal choice to justify claims about values being person-de-
pendent and development being properly carried out at the individual level. 
But autonomy works in a similar way to Nietzsche’s willing. Because of this, 
both Nietzsche and the transhumanist arrive at similar conclusions: freely 
willing beings are the sources of valuing, and these same beings are the drivers 
of development, which occurs at the level of the individual.
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The final similarity Sorgner comments on is the parallel structures of 
progression or evolution that Nietzsche and transhumanists both advance. 
As has been said, the development of the overman is an evolutionary 
development; the overman comes about as part of a historical advance-
ment of one species to another. Sorgner describes this advancement in 
the following way: “[a]ccording to Nietzsche, evolution is not a gradual 
development from one species to another, but takes place in steps. If the 
conditions within one species are such that an evolutionary step can take 
place, various couples at the same time give birth to members of a new 
species. The couples who give birth to the overhuman must have qualities 
that Nietzsche would refer to as those of higher humans … Higher humans 
still belong to the human species, but have some special capacities which 
an overhuman could also have ...” (Ibid., 37). Overmen come from higher 
men, members of the human species that have particular capacities that 
transcend the natural limits of humans. A higher man, however, is not an 
overman. Though some of the higher man’s abilities may go beyond those 
of ordinary humans, his power is not completely qualitatively different 
from individual human persons. Moreover, the higher man is still caught 
in the process of self-overcoming (Ibid., 38). While the overman is the end 
of man’s development, the higher man is still only a step in that process of 
development. Sorgner sees a similar relationship (means to an end versus 
an end) standing between the transhuman and the posthuman. Just as the 
higher man is simply a necessary part of the development of humanity as 
a species into the overman, so too is the transhuman a necessary part of the 
development of humanity as a species into the posthuman. Sorgner does 
differentiate between conceptualizations of transhumans and posthumans, 
claiming that not all transhumanists rely on the same species-to-species 
development model as does Nietzsche.5 What is important for the purposes 
5 Specifically, Sorgner does not think that Bostrom’s understanding of the transhuman 
and the posthuman properly represent Nietzsche’s higher man and overman as paral-
lel steps in an evolutionary process. Sorgner instead picks out the transhumanist F.M. 
Esfandiary as being representative of Nietzsche’s model of progression. The differenc-
es between these two thinkers are related to their conceptualizing of the posthuman as 
being a species-evolved being or not. Esfandiary calls the transhuman an “evolutionary 
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of this paper is that transhumanism, broadly construed, does describe the 
progression of man to something that transcends humanity in a way similar 
to Nietzsche’s description of the role higher humans have to play in the 
development of the overman.
Sorgner, to restate, argues that those who believe there are only super-
ficial similarities between Nietzsche and contemporary transhumanists 
(like Bostrom) are wrong. Sorgner outlines multiple different fundamental 
similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s thesis of the overman 
(as understood with respect to the will to power). Among these similarities 
are the mutability of natures and values; science as a means for self-bet-
terment or self-improvement; the relativization of values; the need for 
self-development; and the process of evolutionary progression from man to 
a transcendent species. The remainder of this paper will show that Sorgner 
does not account for fundamental differences between transhumanism and 
Nietzsche’s thesis of the overman.
3. Does Transhumanism Overcome Man?: Zarathustra Speaks
To adequately respond to Sorgner’s thesis, I need to provide instances of 
fundamental disagreement between Nietzsche and the transhumanists. 
As stated, I will be situating my critique of Sorgner within a discussion of 
the overman. I will argue that the aim of transhumanism – the posthuman 
– differs significantly from the overman. That is, the posthuman and the 
overman are not fundamentally similar. As stated in footnote 2, I take 
Nietzsche’s and Zarathustra’s conceptions of the overman to be compatible, 
such that significantly differing from Zarathustra’s overman will entail also 
significantly differing from Nietzsche’s overman. Because of this, I believe 
that establishing that the transhumanists’ posthuman differs significantly 
from Zarathustra’s overman will sufficiently justify my objecting to Sor-
link” to the posthuman. In contrast, Bostrom believes that individual humans can be-
come posthuman, although this transformation might be effected by similar means as the 
transformation from human to Esfandiary’s transhuman, and Esfandiary’s transhuman to 
his posthuman.
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gner. To argue that there is a significant difference between the two, I will 
show that transhumanism is opposed to three major themes in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra that are characteristic of the overman.
The first characteristic of the overman that transhumanism is opposed to 
is the closeness of the overman to the earth. When Zarathustra first begins 
to teach the overman, one of his initial teachings is that the overman is “the 
meaning of the earth” (Nietzsche 2005, 9). This teaching is further presented 
as an exhortation: “I beseech you, my brothers, remain true to the earth, and 
do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hope!” (Ibid., 10). 
Finally, the teaching is given by contrasting the soul with the body: “Once 
the soul looked contemptuously on the body, and then that contempt was the 
supreme things: – the soul wished the body meager, ghastly, and famished. 
Thus it thought to escape from the body and the earth” (Ibid., 10). The 
overman is intimately linked to his body. Against those (such as Christians) 
who have promised another life beyond this one in which the spirit is no 
longer shackled with the body, Zarathustra proclaims that the overman will 
remain in his body. To go beyond humanity, humanity must return to their 
bodies, ignoring those who revere spirit over matter, the afterlife over this 
current life, and the soul over the body. At first glance, this sort of thinking 
does not seem at all unaligned with the transhumanists. On the contrary, 
transhumanism is a rejection of afterwordly thinking. Transhumanism is, in 
some ways, an attempt to make a heaven here on earth. Rather than having 
to leave the world to have a life in which there will be no pain, no sorrow, 
and no death, transhumanists believe that such a world can be brought 
about now, here. To truly elucidate where transhumanists will differ from 
the closeness to this life that is characteristic of the overman, we need 
further explanation about this closeness from Zarathustra.
One of Zarathustra’s prophecies is addressed to those whom he calls 
the “despisers of the body”. Against these persons, against those who think 
that the soul or spirit is primary in man, Zarathustra so intones: “But the 
awakened one, the knowing one, says: ‘Body am I entirely, and nothing 
more; and soul is only the name of something about the body.’ / The body 
is a great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and 
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also a shepherd. / An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my 
brother, which you call ‘spirit’ – a little instrument and toy of your great 
reason” (Ibid., 32). Against the despisers of body, Zarathustra defends a ho-
listic account of body. Rather than denying the soul and spirit a place in his 
ontology, Zarathustra gives them a role within the body. The soul is a part of 
the body, and the spirit is an instrument of the body’s reason. By subjugating 
the soul and the spirit – or perhaps spirit in general, instead of any particular 
spirit – to the body, Zarathustra illustrates where his disagreement with 
the despisers of the body lies. The despisers of the body, those who are not 
close to the earth and this life, see the body as only a part of the overall man. 
Zarathustra, in contrast, sees the apparent immaterial as merely a part of the 
material. To be close to the earth is to grant the body primary importance. 
This gives us reason to argue against transhumanism’s being compatible with 
Zarathustra’s overman. While transhumanists show great concern with fixing 
bodily problems, they do not grant the body the exalted place that figures into 
how the overman will treat the body. This can be noted in two ways. First, 
transhumanists ultimately care about something that is removed from the 
body: consciousness. Transhumanists are clearly not soul theorists; they are 
not the “otherworldly” Christians who look beyond this life to another, and 
who thereby ignore the body in favor of what is to survive into that next life. 
But transhumanists do look beyond our bodily lives. Take, for instance, the 
idea of linked human-machine intelligences. What would this protect, save? 
Intelligence, while connected to the body, is not intrinsically connected, at 
least as it is treated by transhumanism. Indeed, the idea seems to require 
something that is not bodily (at least in the organic sense). This point is made 
more obviously when applied to digital immortality. The idea of uploading 
human consciousness to a virtual repository is necessarily opposed to a body. 
Moreover, this idea gives primacy to the mind or consciousness, not to the 
body. This rules out transhumanists’ being this-world oriented, something 
the overman will be. As a second comment, related to digital immorality: the 
transhumanist approach to immortality suggests a de-emphasizing of the 
body. If immortality is to be had in the cloud or in robotic shells – if we can 
live on forever so long as our minds are preserved – the role of the body for 
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transhumanism is severely underplayed (compared to the role of the body 
for the overman). But the transhumanists’ concern with immortality is not 
only problematic with how it treats the body.
The second characteristic of the overman that transhumanism is opposed 
to is the overman’s mortality. As I discussed above, one of the avowed goals 
of the transhumanists is to avoid death (or at least greatly prolong life). But 
death figures massively into Zarathustra’s portrayal of the overman. This is 
bluntly said: “Many die too late, and a few die too early. Still the teaching 
sounds strange: ‘Die at the right time!’ Die at the right time: thus teaches 
Zarathustra” (Ibid., 63). Now, to be sure, it would be wrong to call Zarathustra 
some kind of prophet of death. His philosophy is not one that denies life. 
He sharply dismisses such philosophies and such philosophers: “There are 
preachers of death: and the earth us full of those to whom one must preach 
renunciation of life … There are those with consumption of the soul: hardly 
are they born when they begin to die and to long for teachings of weariness 
and renunciation. / They would like to be dead and we should welcome their 
wish! Let us beware of waking those dead ones and of disturbing those living 
coffins” (Ibid., 41). Similar to the otherworldly (if not in many cases identical), 
the preachers of death see this life as being one of suffering and hardship. 
They look forward to the release from such that death promises. Zarathustra 
is not advocating for such thinking when he commands that we die at the 
right time. Rather, Zarathustra is demanding that death be purposeful, and 
suggesting that when we die is a contributing part to the purposefulness 
of our deaths. As he explains: “I show you the consummating death, which 
shall be a spur and a promise to the survivors … My death, praise I to you, the 
voluntary death, which comes to me because I want it. And when shall I want 
it? – Whoever has a goal and an heir, wants death at the right time for the 
goal and the heir” (Ibid., 63). The purpose of death is to make way for one’s 
goal and one’s heir. From later passages, it should be clear that the overman 
is both the goal and heir of Zarathustra.6 Death, then, of mere men, is done so 
6 See, for instance, ibid., 174 (“O my brothers, I consecrate and direct you to a new nobility: 
you shall become procreators and cultivators and sowers of the future … O my brothers, 
your nobility shall not gaze backward, but outward! … You shall make amends to your 
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that the overman might come into existence. Zarathustra, in one of his new 
tablets, calls such a death a sacrifice for the sake of the overman.7 Importantly, 
this idea of sacrificing one’s life for the sake of the future is linked to another 
central characteristic of the overman, self-overcoming.8 Life itself is included 
as a necessary part of this overcoming: “And life itself spoke this secret to 
me. ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must ever overcome itself’” (Ibid., 101). 
To hold onto this life is to stagnate, to prevent the actualizing of the future, 
a future that carries with itself the promise of greater lives for greater beings.
The difficulty posed to transhumanism by the twin ideas of purposeful 
death and self-overcoming is the importance of death itself. If immortality 
is a goal that transhumanists aspire to, they cannot claim to be interested 
in overcoming themselves. While it might be argued that self-overcoming 
is a constitutive part of immortality – that is, that biological humanness 
must be surpassed if life is to be extended indefinitely – this argument fails 
to account for the Zarathustrian condemnation of this life. If there are not 
overmen now, then all humans that exist are merely means to realizing 
the overman. And even if this realization can occur through some sort of 
transformative process that preserves this particular life throughout itself, 
then transhumanism must still account for self-overcoming as a process of 
self-mastery. As Zarathustra teaches, “All that lives, obeys … he who cannot 
obey himself is commanded … Yes, even when it commands itself, it must 
still pay for its commanding. It must become the judge and avenger and 
victim of its own law” (Ibid., 100). Self-overcoming involves internalizing 
the will to power, the will to command rather than to obey. In contrast, 
children for being the children of your fathers: thus shall you redeem all that is past!”), 
and ibid., 280 (“While all this went on Zarathustra spoke only a sentence: ‘My children are 
near, my children –, then he became quite silent … ‘Well! My lion has come, my children 
are near, Zarathustra has grown ripe, my hour has come …”.
7 “O my brothers, the first-born is always sacrificed. But now we are first-born! / We bleed 
on secret sacrificial altars, we all burn and roast in honor of ancient idols … In us ourselves 
he lives on still, the old idol-priest, who roasts our best for his feast. Ah, my brothers, how 
should the first-born now be sacrifices! / But so our kind wants it; and I love those who 
do not wish to preserve themselves. I love with my whole love those who go under and 
perish: for they cross over.” – Ibid., 171. 
8 See ibid., 99–102.
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even if, as conceded above, the augmentative practices of transhumanism 
could produce an overman without the ending of the current and particular 
life of someone who is now human, this would be an extrinsic change. If 
self-overcoming is intrinsic – which it very much seems to be – then these 
technological processes could not satisfy the dual requirements that make 
up the Zarathustrian understanding of death.
Finally, transhumanism stands against the overman’s characteristic task 
of value-creating. This is to say that transhumanists implicitly make or adhere 
to collective value judgements; this contrasts sharply with the overman’s 
transcending of all values and value judgements. This central theme of 
Zarathustra’s ministry is one that does not need to be dwelt on at length. 
I will offer a few selections that exemplify what is meant by the overman’s 
transcending valuation. From the section on the thousand and one goals: 
Truly, men have given to themselves all their good and evil. Truly, they did not 
take it, they did not find it, it did not come to them as a voice from heaven. / Only 
man assigned values to things in order to maintain himself … Truly, this power 
of praising and blaming is a monster. Tell me, O brothers, who will subdue it 
for me? Tell me, who will throw a yoke upon the thousand necks of this beast? 
/ A thousand goals have there been so far … Only the yoke for a thousand necks 
is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. As yet humanity has no goal. / But tell 
me, my brothers, if the goal of humanity is still lacking, is there not also still 
lacking – humanity itself? – (Ibid., 53–54).
From the section on the old and new tablets: “When I came to men, I found 
them resting on an old conceit: all of them thought they had long known 
what was good and evil for man … I disturbed this sleepiness when I taught 
that no one yet knows what is good and evil – unless it be he who creates! 
/ – But it is he who creates man’s goal and gives the earth its meanings 
and its future: that anything at all is good and evil, that is his creation” 
(Ibid., 168). From the section on the higher men: “You creators, you higher 
men! One is pregnant only with one’s own child. / Do not let yourselves 
be imposed upon or beguiled! For who is your neighbor? Even if you do 
things ‘for your neighbor’ – you still do not create for him! / Unlearn this 
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‘for,’ you creators: your very virtue wants you to have nothing to do with 
‘for’ and ‘for the sake of’ and ‘because’ … In your selfishness, you creators, 
is the caution and providence of the pregnant! What no one’s eye has yet 
seen, the fruit: that is sheltered and indulged and nourished by your whole 
love” (Ibid., 249). These should suffice to clarify Zarathustra’s rejection of 
collective or shared values. The overman is a creator of his own values; he 
does not accept the values of others, nor does he value things for the sake 
of others or their own valuings.
Here, our criticism of Sorgner’s thesis will directly engage him. On page 5, 
Sorgner cites Bostrom to support the argument that both transhumanists 
and Nietzsche favor a “reevaluation of values”. Sorgner places particular 
weight on Bostrom’s identification of some transhumanist values, among 
which are critical thinking, open-mindedness, and open discussion (Sorgner 
2009, 32). While Sorgner believes that these values are compatible with 
the non-absolute and created values that Nietzsche espouses, I challenge 
that these qualities are sufficient for giving us a properly Nietzschean (or 
Zarathustrian) vision of value. While Zarathustra will grant readily and easily 
that values are made, not discovered; and while he will also grant readily and 
easily that values depend on men; his ultimate vision of values dismisses any 
sort of collective value. When the overman exists, he will exercise his creative 
power freely and entirely for himself. What Sorgner’s account of Nietzschean 
values lacks is a proper scale for how relativized values are. The fact that 
Bostrom treats some values as being such that all or many transhumanists 
will accept them directly contrasts him with Zarathustra’s understanding 
of the overman’s creation of values. If the values are imposed on multiple 
people, they are not the kind of values that would be created and accepted by 
individual overmen. Even if the values are created and voluntarily accepted by 
multiple people together, they will still not be the kind of values that would 
be created and accepted by individual overmen. As further criticism, one could 
also again point to the fact that there are not any overmen as of yet. Because 
of this, there cannot be any values that are of the kind that will be created by 
overmen. Given this, any value judgements that we acknowledge will be of 
the kind of those value judgements that Zarathustra rejects. Given this, the 
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values and value judgements of transhumanists cannot be compatible with 
Nietzschean thought concerning values in the way that Sorgner suggests.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued against Sorgner’s thesis that transhumanism is 
generally compatible with Nietzsche’s philosophy of the übermensch. To do 
this, I offered a brief description of transhumanism and its principles. I next 
summarized Sorgner’s thesis, noting the points of similarity he observed 
between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy. Finally, I challenged 
Sorgner by showing three points of incompatibility between Zarathustra’s 
treatment of the overman and transhumanism: the overman’s closeness to 
the earth, immortality as a goal, and the collective values of transhumanists. 
To end this paper, I offer two concluding thoughts about where further work 
could be done with respect to my thesis.
Though I granted that Nietzsche’s and Zarathustra’s understandings 
of the overman were such that incompatibility with one would entail 
incompatibility with the other, this point could be proven more rigorously. 
However, this is a less interesting (though perhaps not less important) 
problem that the one I will now propose. Transhumanism, as Bostrom 
himself remarks, is a fragmentary movement. It is, as of yet, not unified 
with respect to all of its goals, the means it recommends to those goals, and 
the justifications it offers for both its goals and the means by which they 
are to be accomplished. Both Sorgner and myself rely on certain themes 
in Nietzsche and Zarathustra being fundamental to them. We also rely on 
certain themes in transhumanism being likewise fundamental in order for 
us to, respectively, compare or contrast transhumanism’s fundamental 
themes with Nietzsche’s and Zarathustra’s fundamental themes. A project 
that remains for those interested in relation between the posthuman and 
the overman is as follows: if transhumanism could become a more unified 
field of thought, would this change the fundamental themes that are 
available for association with Nietzsche’s own thought? In other words, 
would a comprehensive theory of transhumanism give reason to Sorgner 
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or myself to change our conclusions concerning the likeness or dislikeness 
of transhumanism’s posthuman and Nietzsche’s overman?
References
Agar, Nicholas. 2007.“Whereto Transhumanism? The Literature Reaches a Critical 
Mass”. Hastings Center Report, vol. 37, no. 3 (May–June): 12–17.
Agatonović, Miloš. 2018. “The Case of Transhumanism: The Possibility of Application 
of Nietzsche’s Ethics and Critique of Morality Today”. Philosophy and Society, 
vol. 29, no. 3: 317–474.
Blackford, Russell. 2010. “Editorial: Nietzsche and the European Posthumanisms”. 
Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 21, iss. 1 (January): i–iii.
Bostrom, Nick. 2005. “A History of Transhumanist Thought”. Journal of Evolution 
and Technology, vol. 14 (April): 1–25.
Bostrom, Nick. 2005. “Transhumanist Values”. Review of Contemporary Philosophy, 
vol. 4 (May): 3–14.
Hauskeller, Michael. 2010.“Nietzsche, the Overhuman and the Posthuman: A Reply 
to Stefan Sorgner”. Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 21, iss. 1: 5–8.
Hibbard, Bill. 2010. “Nietzsche’s Overhuman is an Ideal Whereas Posthumans Will 
be Real”. Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 21, iss. 1 (January): 9–12.
Hughes, Hames. 2010. “Contradictions from the Enlightenment Roots of Transhu-
manism”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 35: 622–640.
More, Max. 2010.“The Overhuman in the Transhuman”. Journal of Evolution and 
Technology, vol. 21, iss. 1 (January): 1–4.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2005. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Edited by George Stade. Translated 
by Clancy Martin. New York: Barnes & Noble Books.
Porter, Allen. 2017. “Bioethics and Transhumanism” Journal of Medicine and Philos-
ophy, vol. 42: 237–260. 
Ranisch, Robert and Sorgner, Stefan Lorenz. 2014. “Introducing Post- and Trans-
humanism”. Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction, 7–27. Edited by Robert 
Ranisch and Stegan Lorenz Sorgner. Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften: 
Peter Lang GmbH.
Sorgner, Stefan Lorenz. 2009. “Nietzsche, the Overman, and Transhumanism”. Journal 
of Evolution and Technology, vol. 20, iss. 1 (March): 29–42.
Sorgner, Stefan Lorenz. 2010. “Beyond Humanism: Reflections on Trans- and Post-
humanism”. Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 21, iss. 2 (October): 1–19.
Zimmerman, Michael E. 2011. “Last Man or Overman?:Transhuman Appropriations 
of a Nietzschean Theme”. The Hedgehog Review (summer): 31–44.
